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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 39

Disclosure by a state agency in the suprene court.
In Broad Properties, Inc. v. McMorran,162 the question before
the court was whether disclosure may be had from a state agency
under the CPLR.
In an Article 78 proceeding, petitioner sought an order permitting the initiation of disclosure proceedings by way of discovery
and inspection and an examination before trial of respondent,
the New York State Superintendent of Public Works. The court
denied the motion and held that because prior law did not allow
the state or its agency to be the subject of disclosure in the
supreme court, absent an express provision, such disclosure may
not be had under the CPLR.
The plan of the CPLR was to make all disclosure procedures
applicable to the state unless there was a specific provision to the
contrary. 1 63 The Revisers of the CPLR strongly felt that the
treatment given the state should not differ from that given
other litigants unless it was essential to do so.164 Since article
31 of the CPLR, governing disclosure, contains no contrary provisions, it would appear that the state (or an agency of the
state) should be subject to disclosure to the same extent as other
litigants. It is significant that a special exception for the court
of claims was added by the legislature, contrary to the Advisory
Committee's judgment, at the insistence of the Attorney General
to protect the state from disclosure except on order of that court.
Such disclosure on order of the court in the court of claims
differs from the practice in the supreme court where disclosure
may be bad on mere notice
to the adversary without resort to
165
the court for an order.
In the instant case disclosure against an agency of the state
was denied by reliance upon the restrictive reasoning of prior case
law 166 which disallowed such disclosure because of the absence
36242

Misc. 2d 1019, 249 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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under article 31.
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of express statutory authorization. This holding appears to conflict
with the express intent of the Revisers and the provisions of the
CPLR itself which, as already mentioned, sought to have the state
treated in the same way as any other litigant, absent express
provisions to the contrary. Since in the court of claims disclosure
is fully applicable against the state, why deny it against the state
or an agency of the state in the supreme court? If it is feared
that such disclosure would unreasonably burden the state, the
court could require that the disclosure may be had only on
order as is the practice in the court of claims. However, there
is no reason in logic or fairness to limit disclosure simply because
it is sought against the state or a state agency.
An avowed purpose of the CPLR was to ease crowded and
congested court calendars. The liberal use of disclosure devices
not only expedites trials; in many instances, such devices are
decisive in effecting a settlement of litigation out of court. It is
unfortunate that a barrier to this process has been erected by
the instant case. A construction of the CPLR which would
have allowed the disclosure against the state agency in the supreme
court would
have more accurately reflected the aims of the
67
Revisers.1
Statement of defendant-driver given to defendant's insurer held
qualifiedly privileged against disclosure as "material prepared
for litigation."
Plaintiff in a personal injury action moved for discovery
of a statement made prior to the commencement of the action
by the defendant truck driver to the insurance carrier covering
defendants. Defendants resisted disclosure on the ground that
the statement was work product and further that no special
circumstances had been shown. The court held that the statement
constitutes material prepared for litigation and is therefore
qualifiedly privileged from disclosure under CPLR 3101(d).
In order to obtain its disclosure, plaintiff must show that the
report (used interchangeably with "statement") could not be
duplicated and that injustice or hardship would result from its
nondisclosure. The fact that plaintiff was five years of age at
the time of the accident and was unable to recall how it occurred
was not sufficient to compel disclosure in the absence of his showing
an inability to obtain the report through other methods of disclosure,
such as the taking of depositions188
See CPLR 104.
Maiden v. Aid Carpet Serv., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 660, 251 N.Y.S.2d 987
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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